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1 Group selection has always been a controversial issue. It is both advocated as an essential ingredient of human evolution (1-2), and described as a super ‡uous concept, that does not explain any phenomenon we do not already understand with other models (3) (4) (5) . While there is disagreement concerning the relevance, both sides of the debate have come to agree that group selection models can always be reformulated in terms of inclusive …tness (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) .
The agreement on the equivalence still leaves room to disagree which one of the two is more valuable for understanding how group selection works. One position is that, since both are equivalent, there is no reason to look at group selection models other than through the lens of inclusive …tness (4, 7, 9, (11) (12) (13) . Another position is that, even though the two are equivalent, there is value in the alternative way of looking at models, that stresses a balance of within-group selection and between-group selection (1, 2, 8, 10) .
Because the "mathematical equivalence" is such a central point of consensus, one would expect it to be a well-de…ned mathematical statement with a mathematical proof. There is, however, no such theorem in the literature (see also 6, 14) . As a consequence it remains unclear what "mathematical equivalence" means here, and if the claim is correct. In this paper, we will present a class of group selection models that allows us to explore what it could mean for group selection models and inclusive …tness to be equivalent.
It also uncovers two di¤erent kinds of limitations. The limitations imply that group selection and inclusive …tness are not equivalent in general, even though they can be under certain assumptions.
The model is a generalization of (15) . Individuals …nd themselves in groups of equal size, and can be one of two types; defectors and cooperators.
Individual reproduction happens at di¤erent rates; cooperators reproduce at rate 1, defectors reproduce at rate 1 + s. Every individual reproduction event induces a death event; if one individual reproduces, one random individual from the same group is chosen for elimination, thereby keeping group sizes constant. Entire groups also reproduce, and when they do, they produce a daughter group with the exact same proportion of cooperator and defectors.
The rate at which this occurs depends on the fraction of cooperators in the group; a group of size n with i cooperators in it reproduces at rate 1+u i n .
That implies that all-defector groups reproduce at rate 1, and all-cooperator groups reproduce at rate 1 + u. Every group reproduction event induces a group death event; if a group reproduces, a random group is chosen for elimination (see Figure 1 ).
Being a cooperator therefore comes at a cost -it reduces the reproduction rate of the individual by s -but it has a bene…t for all group members, including itself, through an increase in the rate at which the group as a whole reproduces. The baseline reproductive rates for individuals and groups are set to unity for simplicity. The Appendix also covers the more general case where the baseline reproduction rates of individuals and groups are allowed to di¤er. A setup that allows for groups of di¤erent sizes and a variety of group level events, is also possible (16) (17) (18) ).
If we take a limit, where group size and number of groups go to in…nity, then the dynamics simplify to a partial di¤erential equation (PDE). In the limit, the fraction of cooperators in the group becomes a continuous variable,
x, which ranges from 0 to 1. A population at time t is a density t (x) that re ‡ects the relative frequencies of groups with di¤erent shares of cooperators.
The PDE describes how this density changes over time due to the process of group selection (see Figure 2 ). The …rst term on the right hand side describes how individual groups see their fraction of cooperators x go down. The second term describes how 3 high-x-groups increase and low-x-groups decrease in frequency. Between the square brackets, the term x re ‡ects the increase in group reproduction rate of an x-group that is caused by the cooperators in that group. The integral R 1 0 y t (y) dy does not depend on x; it re ‡ects a uniform increase in group death rate that is caused by the fact that cooperators in the entire population increase the growth rates of their groups. Group reproduction events are balanced by group deaths, so the increase in group death intensity must match the average increase in group reproduction -which is R 1 0 y t (y) dy. The PDE is derived in the Appendix.
In order to illustrate how inclusive …tness can match the prediction of a group selection model, we …rst consider the case where = 1. Let M k (t) = R 1 0 x k t (x) dx be the kth moment of the density t . We are interested in the the rate of change of the …rst moment, which is the fraction of cooperators in the overall population. The formula is obtained by integrating the right hand side of the PDE (see the Appendix). For conciseness we will suppress the dependence on t in the notation, assuming that it is clear that M 1 and
If the time derivative d dt M 1 is larger than 0, then the frequency of cooperators is increasing; if it is smaller than 0, the frequency is decreasing. The right hand side of the equation is composed of two terms. The …rst term is negative, or 0, and measures the e¤ect of within group selection, which works against cooperators. If all groups are at x = 0:5, this term is at its minimum -the frequency of cooperators goes down the fastest -and if all groups are either close to x = 0 or close to x = 1, then this term is almost 0, and the frequency of cooperators hardly changes. The second term is u times the variance of the density t . This term is positive, or 0, and measures the e¤ect of between group selection, which works against defectors. This formula thereby re ‡ects an intuition that many have for group selection models; whether or not the share of cooperators increases depends on which of the two is larger.
If we rewrite this formula, we arrive at an equally insightful and intuitive expression, this one in terms of inclusive …tness.
The M 1 (1 M 1 ) term scales the speed of selection, and rb c is the most natural de…nition of inclusive …tness in this setting. Whether or not the frequency of cooperators goes up is determined by whether or not inclusive …tness is larger than 0. De…ning relatedness as r = M 2 (M 1 ) 2 M 1 (M 1 ) 2 is in line with standard de…nitions in the literature (12, 13, 19-21; see also the Appendix).
Moreover, s is indeed the cost of cooperating to the individual; it is the reduction in individual reproduction rate that results from being a cooperator instead of a defector. The aggregate bene…ts to all other group members together are b = s + u. Reducing individual reproduction by s implies reducing the aggregate death rate of the other group members by the same amount, because every individual reproduction is balanced by another individual being eliminated. Moreover, in a group of size n, the contribution of one individual cooperator to the group reproduction rate is u times 1=n.
Since this increase is enjoyed by all n 1 other group members, the aggregate bene…ts to all other group members is u n 1 n , which, in the limit of in…nitely large groups, is u. Hence total aggregate bene…ts are s + u. The bene…t to the individual itself through increased group reproduction is 0 in in…nitely large groups.
How does this change if we allow for general > 0? First we compute the overall change in the frequency of cooperators (see the Appendix).
If we take = 1, we recover equation (1) .
Trying to recast this in terms of inclusive …tness, we …rst observe that with 6 = 1 it is possible that two di¤erent population states have the same relatedness, and yet in one of them the frequency of cooperators is going up, and in the other the frequency of cooperators is going down (see Figure   3 ). That implies that there are no …xed parameters b and c such that the frequency of cooperators goes up if, and only if, rb > c. But also if we allow bene…ts and costs to depend on the current population state, it is still not the case that inclusive …tness accurately matches the direction of selection. In this model, the costs of cooperation are independent of the population state, and should therefore be constant; changing from a defector to a cooperator always means reducing individual reproduction rate by s.
The bene…ts, however, depend on the composition of the group an individual is in. Therefore, also the average bene…ts dispensed by cooperators will no longer be constant, as it will depend on the current distribution. The Appendix contains a derivation, from which it follows that average bene…ts are s + u M M 1 , which depends on the current population density through M and M 1 . However, even if we use the average costs and bene…ts, it remains the case that the signs of rb c and the change in cooperator frequency are sometimes opposing (see the Appendix).
It has been argued that the appropriate approach is then to adjust the de…nition of relatedness, such that inclusive …tness does give the right prediction (22) (23) (24) (25) . If we follow this approach, as we do in the Appendix, then we …nd that the relatedness that would be needed is:
With this approach, the formula for relatedness comes to depend, not only on the current population structure, but also on all parameters that describe the …tness e¤ects. This implies that every other choice for s, u and would require a di¤erent de…nition of relatedness. Relatedness then ceases to be a property of the population structure that has an interpretation of its own, and that can be measured independent of the …tness e¤ects in the model.
With the de…nition of relatedness continuously changing, every case gets its own "rule", which disquali…es it from being one (26).
For the second limitation, we return to the case where = 1. For that case, we have already shown that at any point in time, the direction of selection matches the sign of inclusive …tness. However, if we focus on the trajectory as a whole, we see that relatedness is not constant. As the trajectory unfolds, the density changes, and, since both the frequency of cooperators M 1 and relatedness r are characteristics of that density, they change too (see Figure 4 ). If we have the solution to the PDE, then we also know how r, and Both these limitations imply that it is not the case that everything one can do with a group selection model can also be done with inclusive …tness. That, however, does not mean that there are no assumptions under which there is in fact equivalence. A combination of conditions under which group selection and inclusive …tness are equivalent is that 1) relatedness is exogenously given, and constant, and 2) groups play a public goods game with additive …tness, or "generalized equal gains from switching"(27). Assuming a process where mutations cause small changes in phenotype, in combination with a …tness function that is di¤erentiable is one way to get both a …xed relatedness and equal gains from switching (9) . Whether or not such assumptions are realistic is an empirical question, which our theoretical …ndings cannot answer. They do however show that group selection and inclusive …tness are not mathematically equivalent. This implies that there can be value in exploring group selection models beyond what one can do with inclusive …tness.
Richer models of group selection (15-18) might for instance describe under
what circumstances we should expect selection to move up one level entirely and when it remains a balance between two levels. They might also identify conditions under which a diversity of social attitudes is stable, as it is in this model, where the stable steady state is a distribution in which both types are present (see the Appendix). In many applications the goal is also not just to …nd out whether the fraction of cooperators will increase at a single point in time, but to know what the ultimate fraction cooperators will be, or the change of the fraction of cooperators over a period of time. Models that feature both group and individual level events explicitly, like the ones here and in (ref [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] can tell us what we need to know about the evolutionary dynamics. The fact that not every group selection model can be analyzed with inclusive …tness therefore opens up a range of possibilities that need to be explored, and allows us to pose and answer questions that do not …t the format of inclusive …tness.
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beyond the kin versus group debate. Trends Ecol Evol 26:193-201. how many groups there are with 0, 1, 2 and 3 cooperators, respectively.
In the limit of the group size going to in…nity, groups are characterized by the fraction x of cooperators, and as the number of groups goes to in…nity, the population state becomes a density over (0; 1), that describes how many groups there are for di¤erent cooperator frequencies x. . Relatedness is the same at the two points in time indicated by the arrows. Yet at the …rst one the fraction of cooperators decreases, and at the other it increases. This discrepancy remains if we correct for average costs and bene…ts not being the same at di¤erent moments in time. If we allow costs and bene…ts to depend on the current density, and use average costs for c and average bene…ts for b, then the direction of selection is still not described by the sign of rb c (see the Appendix). Also, the steady state that the population converges to does not satisfy rb c = 0, with average bene…ts b and average costs c. 
Introduction
The appendix begins with the technical results. In Section 2 the partial di¤erential equation is derived. This is the most technical section. Later sections use the PDE, and can also be understood without understanding the details of its derivation. In Section 3 we show that inclusive …tness matches the direction of selection for = 1. In Section 4 we derive that, if inclusive …tness is to match the direction of selection for > 0, relatedness will have to depend on all parameters that describe the …tness e¤ects of cooperation.
In Section 5 we show why relatedness only is not enough information about the current population state for …nding a trajectory. In Section 6 we allow for individual and group baseline reproduction rates to di¤er and we …nd stable steady states. After the technical results, in Section 7, we discuss the results in some more detail than in the main text, which will be useful because of the polarized nature of the debate and the sensitivity of both group selection and inclusive …tness. 1 2 Derivation of the equation for the dynamcs
The stochastic model described in the main text is similar to the ball-andurn process described in Luo (2013) . Let n be the number of individuals in each group and m the number of groups in the population. The main di¤erences between Luo (2013) and the derivation here are that in the model of the main text, a group's reproductive rate is of a more general form,
, and w is …xed at w = 1. In fact, here in the SI we will assume an even more general form, 1 + f ( i n ) for some function f , to demonstrate the full generality of this model. Letting m;n t denote the stochastic model described in the main text, we can take the limit as m; n ! 1 in a similar manner to the limit in Luo (2013) . This gives a law of large numbers, or a ‡uid limit, for the dynamics. The calculations also bear close resemblance to standard derivations of di¤usion limits for standard Moran processes (Karlin and Taylor, 1981, Durrett, 2008) .
To calculate the in…nitesimal mean, or drift, of m;n t , note that:
The …rst bracketed term represents the events that decrease the fraction of groups with i cooperators by 1=m. This can happen if, in a group with i cooperators, a cooperator replicates and a defector dies or a defector dies and a cooperator replicates (…rst term, inside the brackets). Or, if a group with i cooperators is selected to die when another group, with a di¤erent number of cooperators, replicates (second term, inside the brackets). The second bracketed term analogously represents the events that increase the fraction of groups with i cooperators by 1=m. A detailed explanation of these terms can be found in Luo (2013) . This standard approach for deriving a di¤usion limit uses the fact that the probability of an event occurring in a small time interval, t, is equal to the rate that the event occurs multiplied by t.
The o( t) term represents higher order terms corresponding to compound events (more than one event occurring in the interval t), which can be ignored in the limit as t ! 0. Thus, after some rearranging of (1), we …nd Since the in…nitesimal variance is zero, in the in…nite population limit, the time evolution of the population is described deterministically by the equation for the in…nitesimal mean (1). Taking the limit as n; m ! 1, we
Taking f (x) = u x , we obtain the PDE for the system described in the main text. 4 3 Inclusive …tness with = 1
If we take f (x) = ux for the function that describes the increase in group reproduction due to cooperators, then the PDE is:
We now want to describe how the frequency of cooperators in the population as a whole changes. The frequency of cooperators at time t is R 1 0 x t (x) dx, the …rst moment of the density t , also denoted as M 1 . We are interested in the time derivative d dt R 1 0 x t (x) dx = d dt M 1 of the …rst moment. Since the PDE holds for all x, we can multiply left and right by x and integrate from 0 to 1. This will give us an expression for d dt
First we consider the …rst term of the right hand side of the PDE, and use integration by parts.
Then we integrate the second term.
Together that makes:
This can be written in more concise notation as
where M 1 and M 2 are short for the …rst and second moment of t (x). Note that M 2 M 1 0 and M 2 (M 1 ) 2 0.
If we rearrange the derivative of the …rst moment, we get the following:
, c = s and b = s + u, this becomes an expression that implies that the direction of selection follows from the sign of rb c, and that the speed of selection is scaled by M 1 (1 M 1 ) .
Below we will verify that r, c and b are indeed the proper relatedness, costs and bene…ts. 6 
Relatedness
The …rst term between square brackets matches the most common de…nitions of relatedness. One de…nition, which serves as a measure of assortment in general, is r = P (CjC) P (CjD). In this setting, with in…nitely large groups, these probabilities can be described with the following chance experiment. First draw a group, where the probabilities for the type of group that is drawn are described by the density t . Then draw two individuals from that group; both times a cooperator is drawn with probability x. Relatedness is then de…ned as a di¤erence in conditional probabilities, where P (CjC) is the probability that the second is a cooperator, given that the …rst is a cooperator, and P (CjD) is the probability that the second is a cooperator, given that the …rst is a defector (see for instance Bergstrom, 2003 , Van Veelen 2009, 2011a,b and Bowles & Gintis, 2011). This is also consistent with the de…nition of assortment in Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza (1982) and of relatedness in Grafen (1985) .
With this de…nition, we …nd:
An equivalent de…nition of relatedness is r = Cov(X;Y ) V ar(X) ; see for instance Orlove & Wood (1978) , Queller (1992) and Gardner, West & Wild (2011).
If we think of the same experiment as described above, we can de…ne random variable X to be 1 if the …rst individual drawn is a cooperator and 0 if it is a defector, and random variable Y to be 1 if the second individual is a cooperator and 0 if it is a defector. This de…nition of relatedness then amounts to the same:
The reason why E [XY ] = M 2 is that X times Y is 1 only if both X and Y are 1, and 0 if not. In an x-group, X is 1 with probability x and Y is too,
The reason why E X 2 = M 1 is that X 2 is only 1 if X is 1, and 0 if not. In an
x-group, that happens with probability x, so E
Costs and bene…ts
The In …nite groups, the marginal e¤ect on the group reproduction rate is u times one over the group size, but the bene…ts are shared by everyone in the group, and therefore the aggregate bene…ts to everyone else in the group is n 1 n u, where n is the group size, and the group bene…ts to itself are 1 n u. With n ! 1, the bene…ts to self go to 0, and the aggregate bene…ts to the other group members go to u. Total aggregate bene…ts therefore are s + u. 8 
Inclusive …tness with general > 0
If we take f (x) = ux for the function that describes the increase in group reproduction due to cooperators, then the PDE becomes:
We still are interested in the change in the frequency of cooperators, and therefore we compute d dt R 1 0 x t (x) dx = d dt M 1 , the time derivative of the …rst moment, also for the general case. The …rst term on the right hand side of the PDE is still the same. The integral for the …rst term therefore remains s
The integral over the second term becomes
Together that makes
Here we use the shorthand notation M k = M k (t) =
If we now naively repeat the calculations we did in Section 2, we …nd the following:
However,
Moreover, if 6 = 1, then also s and s + u do not describe average costs and bene…ts for all densities t . Therefore we …rst compute the correct average costs and bene…ts, which will be frequency dependent.
Costs and bene…ts
Costs are still constant; whatever the density t is, being a cooperator implies giving up s in individual growth rate. The part of the bene…ts that is the result of the reduced individual growth rate is also constant. Bene-…ts as a result of increased group reproduction, however, do depend on the group a cooperator is in. Average bene…ts therefore should be computed as a weighted average over all the types of groups a cooperator can be in.
In the limit of n ! 1, the aggregate marginal change from being a cooperator rather than a defector is dux dx = u x 1 (note that for = 1 this equals u, which is independent of x). At a given density t , that implies that the average aggregate bene…t dispensed by being a cooperator instead of a defector through increased group growt rate equals:
For = 1 this equals u, as we would expect.
Inclusive …tness with the standard de…nition of r
The costs are indeed s and the average bene…ts are indeed s + u M M 1 . Hence the r that "makes Hamilton's rule work" is:
This does however depend on , s and u.
Interpretation
In the previous subsection, we rewrote the condition for d dt M 1 to be positive. The condition we arrived at is
It is a Procrustean stretch though to refer to this as "Hamilton's rule". Both r and the c=b ratio now depend on everything -both depend on , s, u and the current density t -and relatedness is therefore no longer a quantity that can be interpreted as a property of a population structure, as it varies with all parameters that describe the …tness e¤ects. Therefore the "rule"
itself changes along with every change in the case it is applied to, and r just serves as a remainder term to make up for whatever di¤erences there are between what Hamilton's rule would have to be with normal relatedness and the correct prediction.
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If we return to the case with = 1, then the time derivative of the …rst moment is positive if and only if rb > c, with r relatedness, and c and b costs and bene…ts;
Even though c and b do not depend on the density t , and therefore will be constant along the trajectory, for …nding a solution of the PDE it is not enough to know relatedness at time t = 0. Knowing r at time t = 0 will tell us the direction of selection at time t = 0, but not at t > 0, because also r will change over time.
Here we compute the time derivative of r. This will also require that
This is multiplied by x 2 and integrated from 0 to 1. The …rst term of the right hand side is then
The second term is:
Together that implies
If we now take the time derivative of r = M 2
it is clear that this requires the time derivative of M 2 , which requires that we know M 3 .
Similarly, the second derivative of r requires that we know M 4 , and so on.
Therefore one needs to know all the moments of 0 to …nd the trajectory. This implies that for all x 2 (0; 1)
If we de…ne (1) = lim x!1 (x), then also the following must hold
If we take M 1 = 1 and …ll that in in the PDE, we …nd that for all x 2 (0; 1):
Any Cx 2 is a solution of this di¤erential equation, but we also need R 1 0 Cx 2 dx = 1
Therefore the following density is a steady state.
The second moment and the r of the steady state are:
The latter is quite intuitive, because according to Hamilton's rule -which points to the direction of selection correctly if = 1 -a steady state must satisfy r = c b = 1 1+ . Note however that this is a necessary, but not a su¢ cient condition for it to be a steady state; there are many densities with r = 1 1+ , for which therefore d dt M 1 = 0, but which are not steady states (for instance all those for which M 1 6 = 1 ). Moreover, this steady state is stable.
Steady states if > 0
A density is a steady state if d dt (x) = 0 for all x 2 (0; 1)
This implies that for all x 2 (0; 1)
As before, M = M (t) = R 1 0 x t (x) dx. If we de…ne (1) = lim x!1 (x), then also the following must hold
If we take M = 1 and …ll that in in the PDE, we …nd that for all x 2 (0; 1) we should stress here that this only describes theoretical possibilities, and as such it is not about whether or not there is empirical support that these possibilities describe actual processes that have shaped social evolution in one species or the other.
As a point of departure, we take Hamilton (1975) . On page 336 of Hamilton (1975) , he writes:
The usefulness of the 'inclusive …tness'approach to social behaviour (i.e. an approach using criteria like (b AB K k) > 0) is that it is more general than 'group selection', 'kin selection', or 'reciprocal altruism' approaches and so provides an overview even where regression coe¢ cients and …tness e¤ ects are not easy to estimate or specify.
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This can safely be taken to imply that both group selection and kin selection models are thought of as being included in the set of all models that can be described in terms of inclusive …tness. The paper by Hamilton (1975) is not about how group selection and kin selection relate, but contains some cues that suggest that neither one needs to be contained in the other. This is illustrated in Figure 2 . Figure 2 . An illustration for Hamilton (1975) To describe more in general how the three could relate, we draw a second …gure ( Figure 3 ). We have three sets of models; group selection models, kin selection models and models that can be analyzed with inclusive …tness.
GS KS IF
Any way in which those relate can be reduced to statements about subsets 1 to 7 in the …gure. The quote from Hamilton (1975) , depicted in Figure 1 , basically suggests that subsets 1, 2 and 3 are empty, and that subset 7 is not. Our results disagree with the …rst part of that suggestion. We have shown that not all group selection models can be analyzed with inclusive …tness, and therefore that the union of sets 1 and 2 is not empty.
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Before we will go over all the subsets, we should make two remarks. The …rst is about assortment and kin selection.
One of the key insights, or maybe the key insight in the theory of kin selection, is that the recipients of the bene…ts that cooperation brings might not be just anyone. Others that share a gene for altruism, or cooperation, might be overrepresented on the receiving end. For a sel…sh gene, making its bearer be an altruist might therefore be in its own genetic interest, if the recipient of that altruism is relatively likely to also be a carrier of that gene. Moreover, if a trait is truly altruistic -that is, if it involves an actual net cost; this is sometimes referred to as strong altruism -then the ‡ip side of the same coin is that it will not be selected, unless there is some way in which the average altruist faces a di¤erent set of recipients than the average non-altruist.
Here one can properly say, almost trivially, that assortment is more general than genetic assortment. If there is some mechanism that assorts altruistic behaviors, then those can be selected, even if there is no genetic assortment. 1 include all sources of common descent when the word kin selection is used.
Whichever choice is made is inconsequential for our …ndings, which concern inclusive …tness, not kin selection. For this overview we however choose to reserve the word kin selection for cases where assortment is genetic. If we do, then that implies that the union of 1 and 4 is non-empty -we allow for assortment in groups to be non-genetic.
What should be included in the set of group selection models is another question. Here the aim is not to determine the exact boundaries of that set.
We do however want to exclude models that feature groups, but that are not group selection models, and in which the properties of individuals in the group are just the result of individual selection. One possible de…nition we could use to exclude those is the de…nition from Simon et al. (2013) .
That de…nition states that "if a trait establishes itself in a model of twolevel population dynamics when group-level events are present, and does not establish itself in the same model when they are absent, then the trait evolves by group selection." The model from the main text clearly satis…es that de…nition. There are also other models, in which group level events are not explicitly modeled. For those this de…nition is hard to check, as it is unclear how to take the group level events out. Yet they may very well qualify for being a group selection model. In the discussion below, we will argue that all subsets are non-empty. For the purpose of this discussion, therefore, it is enough to point to models that surely should be included according to any de…nition of group selection. Which other models should also be alotted to those sets is also interesting, but not the aim of this exercise.
Subset 5. We would like to begin the overview with subset 5. This set contains models that fall both under group and kin selection, and moreover can be analyzed with inclusive …tness. The current consensus is that all group selection models can be analyzed with inclusive …tness. Given that this equivalence is regularly also referred to as the equivalence of group and kin selection, it is completely uncontroversial to say that this set is not empty. An actual theorem that shows that this is indeed not empty is Theorem 5 in Van Veelen (2011a). If relatedness is exogenously …xed, and the interactions have …tness e¤ects that imply "generalized equal gains from switching" (Nowak & Sigmund, 1990 , Van Veelen 2009 , 2011a ), then the theorem shows that inclusive …tness actually determines the entire dynamics.
If assortment is furthermore genetic, that puts us into subset 5.
Subset 4. If assortment is not genetic, but the …tness e¤ects imply generalized equal gains from switching, then the same theorem applies, but the model …nds itself in subset 4. This subset therefore is not empty either.
Again, whether or not this possibility is relevant depends on whether or not there are interesting examples of non-genetic assortment in groups.
Subsets 1 and 2. The results in this paper imply that the union of sets 1 and 2 is not empty; there are group selection models that can not be recast in terms of inclusive …tness. If we allow for assortment of phenotypes as well as genotypes, that means that both 1 and 2 individually are not empty either. interpreted as to imply that subset 3 is not empty. Their setup typically also allows for an interpretation in terms of social learning, so that claim can also be interpreted as a statement that there are models that are in none of the three sets; neither group selection, nor kin selection, nor allowing for an inclusive …tness analysis.
Empirics
There is no consensus about whether or not group selection is helpful, or needed, for explaining any observed phenomenon in the living world, and especially in humans. Positions range from Sober & Wilson (1998) and , who claim that group selection is an essential ingredient in explaining many cooperative behaviours, including in humans, to and , who claim it contributes nothing to our understanding of them. Although there are obviously links with theory, this is mainly an empirical question. Answering it would involve estimates of parameters that feature in theoretical group selection models in order to see if the circumstances in the real world are comparable, or even anywhere close to those that are required to make the theoretical model work. Also the predictions that group selection models make, for instance about behaviour, should be tested with data, and this should be compared to how well these data are in line with alternative explanations. This paper is not about that empirical question. Our paper is only an investigation whether or not any group selection model can always be reformulated in terms of inclusive …tness. We claim that this is true in some settings, but not in others.
